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INTRODUCTION  
 How does one take down a sovereign? Early modern dramas such as 
Shakespeare’s Macbeth, Julius Caesar, Coriolanus and Marlowe’s Edward II all answer 
this question with regicide. Christopher Marlowe’s Tamburlaine plays, however, raise the 
stakes of political tragedy and ask a question that cannot be so easily answered. How 
does one take down a totalitarian who has managed to convince every one around him 
that he and only he has the power to create reality?  
 Christopher Marlowe’s Tamburlaine is a “monster turned to manly shape” (Part 
1, II. vi. 16), a totalitarian who seems to live up to the title by speaking a new reality into 
existence and thereby controlling every thing and every person on the world-stage. In 
Tamburlaine, The Great Parts 1 and 2, Marlowe’s audience watches “barbarous bloody 
Tamburlaine” (Part 2, V. i. 133) discursively shape the ways in which those around him 
see their own bodies and the embodiment of universal ‘truths.’ Tamburlaine operates 
within an ideological fantasy that insists on his infinite sovereignty through prophesied 
speech-acts.  And yet, contemporaneous translations of Pedro Mexia’s 1540 Silvia de 
Varia Lecion ensured that Marlowe’s audience knew Tamburlaine’s regime did stop and 
did lose power by the fourteenth century.1 Furthermore, in the prologue of Part 2, 
Marlowe explicitly tells his audience that “death cuts off the progress of [Tamburlaine’s] 
pomp / And murd’rous Fates throws all his triumphs down” (Part 2, Prologue. 4-5). 
Therefore, Tamburlaine does not “stress virtually unlimited opportunities for self-
assertion,” as many critics have suggested (Bevington).2 On the contrary, these plays 
prove that Tamburlaine’s pompous promise to “become immortal like the gods” will 
never come true (Part 1, I. ii. 201). 
2 
 Tamburlaine Parts 1 and 2 disprove the foundational tenets of the protagonist’s 
autocratic beliefs by exposing the embodied reality behind his myth of limitless power. 
Tamburlaine’s narrative of absolute rule demands the warrior-king’s strict identification 
with a doctrine of prophecy and performative speech. The Tamburlaine plays complicate 
the eponymous hero’s “infinite ambition, … inordinate lust, and unbounded belief in his 
own victorious destiny,” by illustrating a reality in which political power is constituted 
through and yet threatened by human bodies (Ingram 41). Tamburlaine needs dead 
material bodies to prove the veracity of his public word and live bodies to willingly enact 
the bloody domination he repeatedly promises. The plays reveal that Tamburlaine’s 
hegemony is in fact consolidated in transactions of active consent, not in authoritarian 
commands. Tamburlaine’s dogmatic identification with the word of power ultimately 
exposes that his speech-act doctrine is a fiction through the need for bodily proof and 
willing consent. Tamburlaine, The Great Parts 1 and 2 provide a narrative filled with 
violent spectacle, subtle irony and what Ben Jonson critically called “scenical strutting” 
and “furious vociferation” in order to explore the limits of one man’s sovereignty (398). 
Marlowe’s dramas give theatrical form to the conceptual space of friction between a 
tyrant’s speech and his actions.  
 
OVERIDENTIFICATION IN TAMBURLAINE, THE GREAT  
 
 Tamburlaine, Parts 1 and 2 represent a process through which Tamburlaine 
destroys himself and his regime by adhering fanatically to his own public word. Because 
he believes that prophecies term him the “Scourge of God,” Tamburlaine himself says, “I 
must apply myself to fit those terms / In war, in blood, in death, in cruelty” (Part 2, IV. i. 
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154-156). Tamburlaine reveals that the protagonist’s complete adoption of his role is in 
fact a too-literal identification, or an overidentification. Slavoj Žižek offers a useful 
paradigm for thinking about the overidentification of Marlowe’s Tamburlaine. Žižek 
writes,  
sometimes, at least — overidentifying with the explicit power discourse - ignoring 
this inherent obscene underside and simply taking the power discourse at its 
(public) word, acting as if it really means what it explicitly says (and promises) — 
can be the most effective way of disturbing its smooth functioning (“De Capo 
senza Fine” 217-220).3  
 
For Tamburlaine The Great, the public word of power is the speech-act. The warrior-king 
overidentifies with the ideological fantasy of performative speech founded in divination.  
More specifically, Tamburlaine overidentifies with the concept that his interpretations of 
oracles are performative and illocutionary. Tamburlaine’s unflinching fidelity to public 
predictions exposes the fallacy of performative speech and the true fragility of his 
dominion over the world-stage 
 Marlowe’s plays set up the inevitability of Tamburlaine’s overidentification as the 
man destined to violently “scourge the pride of such as Heaven abhors” (Part 2, IV. i. 
149). Tamburlaine refers to himself and is referred to by others as the “scourge of God” 
no less than a dozen times over the course of the hugely popular Tamburlaine plays.4 
This Scythian warrior not only understands himself as having been “termed the terror of 
the world,” (Part 2, V. iii. 45), he identifies with the role so much that the terms 
themselves appear to determine each ensuing event. Tamburlaine claims time and again 
that prophecies dictate his destiny to become “arch- monarch of the world” (Part 2, I. ii. 
114).5 These prophecies and oracles, then, become the original public word of 
Tamburlaine’s ideological edifice and the foundation of his single-minded self-
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identification.6 Mycetes, the King of Persia before Tamburlaine, calls the blood-thirsty 
warrior “misled by dreaming prophecies, / To reign in Asia” (Part 1, I. i. 40-42).7 
Tamburlaine insists that his merciless hegemony is and always has been fated, and he 
successfully convinces others of this fiction as well. By convincing others that his 
interpretation of oracles is the predetermined truth, Tamburlaine makes it look as though 
he has the authority to constitute “the given through utterances,” through his speech 
(Bourdieu 170).  In other words, Tamburlaine makes it seem as if the forces of destiny 
have given him the power to control words and with words, to make and destroy the 
world any way he wants. Tamburlaine follows prophetic narratives to the word, insisting 
that these doctrines grant him the ability to control constituitive language.  
 Still dressed in his shepherd’s cloak, Tamburlaine prophesies in Act 1 of Part 1 
that he will be a “terror to the world,” conquering Asia and Africa until he measures “the 
limits of his empery / By east and west as Phoebus doth his course” (Part 1, I. ii. 38-40). 
Marlowe demonstrates Tamburlaine’s cunning manipulation of the “symbolic power” of 
words in the warrior’s first pivotal stage appearance (Bourdieu 170). In this scene, 
Tamburlaine holds an Egyptian princess and band of Egyptian lords hostage. One lord, 
Magnetes, appeals for the group’s release by promising further earthly treasures and by 
informing Tamburlaine that he and his fellow Egyptians “have his highness’ letters to 
command / Aid and assistance,” which Tamburlaine spurns and disavows, saying that 
“these letters and commands / Are countermanded by a greater man” (Part 1, I. ii. 21-22). 
Tamburlaine makes use of the double meaning of “letters” through what Johannes 
Birringer calls the “duplicitous translatability of discourse” so that the Egyptian’s letters 
represent Magnetes’s mastery of language (220). Understanding letters and language as 
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units to be controlled plays into Tamburlaine’s illusion of speech-acts. He proclaims that 
he now commands authority of the captives’ letters, and through that, all of their words. 
Tamburlaine’s regime starts here in all its dissimulation and totalitarian glory when he 
makes himself the supreme “dictator” and author of all words.  
 
SPEECH-ACTS 
 
 Tamburlaine insists that his “words are oracles,” implying that he has 
performative or effective speech (Part 1, III. iii. 102). If one is to believe Tamburlaine’s 
argument that his public word is more true than “Apollo’s oracles,” (Part 1, I. ii. 212), 
then Tamburlaine must have the power of “illocutionary” speech. In what has become a 
field-defining text, How to Do Things with Words, J. L. Austin describes an 
“illocutionary” act as a “performance of an act in saying something as opposed to 
performance of an act of saying something” (99-100). With nearly a coronation per act 
and a spectacular closing marriage ceremony, Tamburlaine Part 1 contains a generous 
number of those legal performances commonly used to illustrate illocutionary speech-
acts, those in which a task is accomplished in the moment a person in power speaks 
particular utterances. It is no surprise, then, that critics such as Marjorie Garber have 
called Tamburlaine a “master of speech-acts” capable of “performative illocutionary 
utterance[s]” (Garber 302). Mark Thornton Burnett expands upon Garber’s argument 
when he claims that while Tamburlaine is at first “drawn as a master of linguistic power” 
in Marlowe’s first installment, Part 2 demonstrates “Tamburlaine’s failing prowess with 
parlance” (128). I want to complicate both Garber and Burnett’s well-founded readings 
by noting the ways in which the plays actually depict an ongoing tension between the 
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fiction of performative speech and the material reality of living and dead bodies. Before I 
turn to the illusion of performative speech and the truth of embodiment, I want to map 
out how the speech-acts seem to operate in these plays.  
 Tamburlaine repeatedly proclaims that he can create reality by speaking it into 
existence. Statements such as “will and shall best fitteth Tamburlaine” demonstrate his 
belief in illocutionary speech (Part 1, III. iii. 40-41). The dramas, on the contrary, reveal 
that Tamburlaine’s speech is perlocutionary rather than illocutionary. The distinction 
between perlocutionary and illocutionary utterances is a notoriously difficult one to 
undertake, but this theoretical sticking point is one that Marlowe illustrates with both 
nuance and bloody spectacle in Tamburlaine Parts 1 and 2. Perlocutionary acts “are 
instrumental to the accomplishment of actions, but they are not themselves the actions 
which they help accomplish (Butler “Burning Acts- Injurious Speech” 197). Because 
Tamburlaine’s statements are perlocutionary rather than illocutionary, he must fulfill his 
promises in order to prove to others that his “words are oracles.” In other words, 
Tamburlaine’s power does not reside in illocutionary speech-acts, but rather in his ability 
to convince others that it does. Tamburlaine consolidates his military supremacy by 
making people believe in his supposed linguistic power. As Theridamas says, “Not 
Hermes, the prolocutor to the gods, / Could use persuasion more pathetical” (Part 1, I. ii. 
210). Tamburlaine says that his words are powerful because of his prophecied identity, 
but the plays themselves demonstrate the persuasive skills that actually enable this 
Scythian’s rule.   
 Perhaps the most commonly noted “working words” (Part 1, II. iii. 25) in 
Tamburlaine, are those that act as weapons.8 In the prologue of Part 1, Marlowe 
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introduces his villainous hero as “Threat’ning the world with high astounding term,  / 
And scourging kingdoms with his conquering sword” (Prologue. 5-6). These two short 
lines of blank verse suggest a parallel between term and sword, and so introduce the 
contradictory ways in which linguistic acts, rather than spectacles of torture, seem to 
perform the real violence in Tamburlaine.9 Marlowe offers numerous examples of the 
word-weapon conflation. For instance, Mycetes tells Theridamas, “thy words are swords” 
(Part 1, I. i. 74), Techelles says, “our swords shall play orators for us” (Part 1, I. ii. 132), 
and Zenocrate gives Agydas “leave to wound me with these words” (Part 1,III. ii. 35).10 
Repeated references to the wounding capabilities of words work to naturalize the 
ideology of effective speech and make Tamburlaine’s myth of absolute power so 
seemingly successful. The notion of “working words” in the Tamburlaine dramas 
contends that language can express violence and language can perform violence.  
 Marlowe illustrates the charade of autocratic domination by way of performative 
speech after Bajazeth and Zabina insult Tamburlaine from inside a horse-drawn cage. 
Zenocrate asks Tamburlaine “My lord, how can you suffer these outrageous / curses by 
these slaves of yours?” to which Tamburlaine responds, “To let them see, divine 
Zenocrate, / I glory in the curses of my foes, / Having the power from the empyreal 
heaven / To turn them all upon their heads” (Part 1, IV. iv. 26-31). Tamburlaine tells his 
lady and the audience that his identity makes him impervious to the damaging words of 
others. Like the weaponized words Tamburlaine says he wields, his very material 
possession of abstract words in Tamburlaine Part 1, depends on his insistence that words 
act like objects. By making it seem as though words function like material objects, 
Tamburlaine can then use words the way he would use things, such as swords
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spoils of war. This means that treating linguistic units as if they are tangible entities gives 
Tamburlaine the ability to claim them for himself. Tamburlaine consolidates his tyranny 
over others by making them believe he snatches the words right out of their mouths.   
 According to Tamburlaine’s mythological narrative, he has been destined to 
overtake the objectified words of all people in his path to world conquest. After 
Tamburlaine defeats Bajazeth, the Turk’s wife, Zabina, rails at her captors, “Injurious 
villains, thieves, runagates! / How dare you thus abuse my majesty?” (Part 1, III. iii. 225-
226). When Theridamas indulges Zabina’s argument by way of reasoning that now 
Zenocrate has majesty and not the Turkess, Tamburlaine refuses to even entertain a 
discussion of sovereignty, telling his man, “Not now, Theridamas, her time is past. / The 
pillars that have bolstered up those terms / Are fall’n in clusters at my conquering feet” 
(Part 1, III. iii. 228-230). Tamburlaine tries to convince his allies and enemies that 
Zabina’s words are evacuated of all potency. He is contending that because Zabina does 
not have Tamburlaine’s god-given symbolic power, her words are ineffective and hollow. 
So according to Tamburlaine’s doctrine, Zabina’s words are not weapons. This 
fundamentalist interpretation of public doctrine holds that Tamburlaine’s prophecies are 
constituted of speech-acts and so these promises must be fulfilled, including the promise 
that Tamburlaine is endowed with effective speech.    
 Tamburlaine believes that his utterances are speech-acts because “fates and 
oracles of heaven have sworn / To royalize the deeds of Tamburlaine,” and these oracular 
declarations must be realized (Part 1, I. ii. 7-8). This belief ironically traps Tamburlaine 
in a web of forced identification.  In fact, the speech-act is simply the logical 
development of a world predetermined by such divinations. This means that 
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Tamburlaine’s violent ascendency is only the material actualization of illocutionary 
prophecies written before he ever lifted a sword in battle. By claiming that his reign is 
preordained by the stars “who never meant to make a conqueror / So famous as is mighty 
Tamburlaine” (Part 2, III. v. 83-84), Tamburlaine turns himself into a figure that 
ultimately has no control over his own destiny, even as he seems to be controlling nation 
after conquered nation.11  His insistence that oracles are speech-acts means that he can do 
nothing but enact each prophecied exploit. Tamburlaine calls himself “I that am term'd 
the scourge and wrath of God / The only fear and terror of the world” (Part 1, II. iii. 44-
45), suggesting that he has no alternative but to identify with terms that have identified 
him. Furthermore, Tamburlaine can only prove that his public word is true if he makes 
them come true with material actions. An overly-literal interpretation of public discourse 
demands that Tamburlaine’s “actions top his speech” (Part 1, II. iii. 25) and his “deeds 
shall prove” (Part 1, I. ii. 34) his right to reign in Asia with “barbarous arms” (Part 1, I. i. 
42), not witty words.  This is only one of the double logics of Tamburlaine’s power. He 
becomes a totalitarian of the material world by identifying absolutely with words he 
cannot defy.  
 Marlowe illustrates Tamburlaine’s forced interpellation by his own dogma on the 
eve of the slaughter of Damascus. Tamburlaine previously instated a chromatic code of 
genocidal violence, in which the erection of black tents signifies the inevitable 
annihilation of a community. This chromatic code is a component of Tamburlaine’s 
public word, his discourse of power inherited from prophecy. Marjorie Garber aptly 
suggests that perhaps Tamburlaine is so “adept in the language of signs” because “his 
semiotic codes [like the colored tents] are far from subtle” (302). This scene shows how 
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Tamburlaine is both adept at and also trapped by his unsubtle system of signs. The 
conqueror is trapped into corporeally enacting his promises by means of mass murder. 
When the governor of Damascus appoints six virgins to offer a laurel of peace, 
Tamburlaine approaches with his soldiers “all in black, and very melancholy” (Part 1, V. 
i. 63) because the tyrant regrets the fact that he must murder these “poor fools” from 
Damascus (Part 1, V. i. 65). When the virgins supplicate for their lives, Tamburlaine 
replies, “in vain ye labour to prevent / That which mine honour swears shall be 
performed” (Part 1, V. i. 106-107). Tamburlaine has no choice but to murder these 
women because he cannot go back on something he previously said. The audience can 
now recognize that this “all-powerful” sovereign is a slave to his own honor. 
Tamburlaine constructs his infamy by way of his “name and honour,” a form of his 
public word he “shall spread” (Part 1, V. i.) by slaughtering nations. 12 Tamburlaine is 
both an agent of conquest and an interpellated enactor of expanding credo. 
 Tamburlaine must physically enact public word in order for those prophecies to 
be made legitimate on the world-stage. The necessity of material manifestation 
complicates Tamburlaine’s interaction with the Persian king, Mycetes, in Act 2 of Part 1. 
First, Tamburlaine out-wits Mycetes when he seizes the king’s crown and asks  
 Tamburlaine: You will not sell it, will ye? 
 Mycetes: Such another word, and I will have thee executed. Come, give it to me. 
 Tamburlaine: No, I took it prisoner. 
 Mycetes: You lie, I gave it to you. 
 Tamburlaine: Then ‘tis mine. 
 Mycetes: No, I mean I let you keep it (Part 1, II. iv. 26-34). 
 
Here, Marlowe humorously demonstrates what at first seems to be Tamburlaine’s 
illocutionary ability to take over Mycetes’s crown and through synecdoche the Persian 
nation. While there is no doubt that Mycetes does look the fool in this moment of poorly 
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matched wits, Tamburlaine is not the unchecked totalitarian he claims to be. The moment 
Mycetes consents to Tamburlaine’s taking of the crown, the Persian king destabilizes the 
power dynamics at play. The truth is that Tamburlaine cannot fulfill prophecy unless he 
seizes the crown through warfare, not debate.  
  Tamburlaine uncharacteristically hands the crown back to Mycetes, saying, 
“Here, take it for a while. / I lend it thee / Till I may see thee hemmed with armed men. / 
Then shalt thou see me pull it from thy head” (Part 1, II. iv. 36-38). Why does 
Tamburlaine have to pull the crown from Mycetes’s head in battle when it’s already in 
his hands? In a narrative bait-and-switch that parallels Tamburlaine’s rhetorical trickery, 
Marlowe traps his hero in the masquerade of speech-acts. Because Tamburlaine believes 
that prophecies are speech-acts, he must belatedly manifest his oracular interpretations. 
Marlowe shows that his protagonist is nothing more than a servant to the master of 
identification. Because Tamburlaine has publicly stated, “gracious stars have promised” 
the “possession of the Persian crown” at his birth (Part 1, I. ii. 91-92), he becomes the 
subject who needs to tangibly perform that supposedly illocutionary prophecy. Not only 
does Tamburlaine have to perform his predicted taking of the Persian crown, he must do 
so with bodies in bloody warfare.13  
 Tamburlaine, The Great Part 2 explores the extents to which Tamburlaine will 
adhere to his own brutal discourse after he discovers that his first-born son, Calyphas, 
ignored the king’s commands and abstained from battle. Tamburlaine acts in accordance 
with his identity as “the scourge of God and terror of the world,” (Part 2, IV. i. 154) 
when he stabs and kills Calyphas. Many scholars read the murder of Calyphas as a 
“culminating demonstration of Tamburlaine’s capacity for unmitigated cruelty,” though 
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this assumption is, as Carolyn Williams states, “open to question” (56).14 I argue that the 
play’s brutal filicide is above all, a culminating demonstration of the speech-act trap. This 
is to say that Tamburlaine must kill his own son because to not do so would mean 
disproving prophecies and the myth of performative speech. When Calyphas expressed a 
desire to refrain from warfare two acts earlier, Tamburlaine called his son a “Bastardly 
boy, sprung from some coward’s loins / And not the issue of great Tamburlaine” (Part 2, 
I. iii. 69-70), then explicitly ordered Calyphas to murder or be murdered in turn. 
Tamburlaine told Calyphas, “hold [the enemy] and cleave him, too, or I’ll cleave thee” 
(Part 2, I. iii. 104). This threat becomes Tamburlaine’s public word, binding the 
sovereign to action. When Calyphas refuses to fight, Tamburlaine must enact doctrine 
and kill his own son. Tamburlaine himself insists that he has no choice but to “execute” 
“these terrors and these tyrannies” “enjoined [him] from above” (Part 2, IV. i. 146, 148). 
Tamburlaine explains his compulsory actions saying, 
since I exercise a great name,  
The scourge of God and terror of the world,  
I must apply myself to fit those terms,  
In war, in blood, in death, in cruelty,  
and plague such peasants as resist in me  
The power of heaven’s eternal majesty (Part 2, IV. i. 153-158) 
 
Tamburlaine’s devotion to his name empowers and ensnares the warrior-king.   
 
THE TRUTH OF EMBODIMENT 
 
 Tamburlaine’s tyrannical regime is haunted by the fact that every supposed 
speech-act does not just become reality through the magic of illocution. Instead, each 
speech-act depends on a constellation of material bodies. Tamburlaine needs dead, 
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objectified bodies to prove that his performative power is legitimate and he needs live 
bodies to consent to his commands. Tamburlaine cannot acknowledge this hidden truth of 
embodiment, because to do so would mean admitting that his power is less than absolute.  
 The speech-act narrative maintains that Tamburlaine wounds his enemies with 
words, and thus the physical violation of fleshly bodies on the stage should be 
unnecessary, if not counter to the canon of pre-destined rule. In that case, why does 
Tamburlaine show off the corpses of his victims?  For example, why have the Governor 
of Babylon “hung up in chains” (Part 2, V. i. 148) and publicly shot? The discourse of 
power says that Tamburlaine should be able to kill the governor simply by saying so. The 
plays reveal that Tamburlaine needs these fully objectified, dead bodies as evidence in 
order to validate his speech-acts. All perlocutionary statements assume a “burden of 
evidence,” and Tamburlaine satisfies this burden by flaunting the carcasses of those he 
conquers (Butler 17).15 At the end of Part 1, Tamburlaine explains how dead bodies 
legitimate his dominion as he crowns his wife in a field of slaughtered corpses, saying 
“Emperors and kings lie breathless at my feet … All sights of power to grace my victory / 
And such are objects fit for Tamburlaine” (Part 1, V. i. 469, 474-475). This means that 
the parading around of mangled corpses in Tamburlaine is not simply  “triumphal 
pageant,” but material testimony to the physical labor necessary for maintaining an 
illusion of performative speech (Romaney and Lindsey xvii). Tamburlaine uses dead 
material bodies as evidence of his power in order to make people believe that he is in fact 
a totalitarian in the truest sense of the word.   
 Tamburlaine’s myth of performative speech can only function so long as he never 
acknowledges his actual dependency on the consent and participation of other bodies. 
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This means that Tamburlaine can only maintain sovereignty by never wavering from the 
well-known axiom that, “will and shall best fitteth Tamburlaine, / Whose smiling stars 
gives him assured hope / Of martial triumph ere he meet his foes” (Part 1, III. iii. 41-43). 
An overly-literal interpretation of prophecies forces Tamburlaine to ignore the fact that 
no matter what he says to the contrary, “his foes” always have the option of either 
consenting or refusing to join the Scythian band of “base, usurping vagabond[s]” (Part 1, 
IV. iii. 21). The plays, in contrast, expose the fact that Tamburlaine’s commands are 
actually transactions, always contingent on the embodied agency of others.  
 In Tamburlaine, a consenting body performs submission by moving or not 
moving in whatever ways the monarch commands.  In Part 1, the soldiers Techelles and 
Usumcasane first physically perform their active consent by not moving their bodies 
upon Tamburlaine’s request. Tamburlaine tells the soldiers to abort a planned attack, 
ordering them to, “keep all your standings and not stir a foot” (Part 1, I. ii. 150). 
Techelles and Usumcasane remain still and in doing so, acquiesce to Tamburlaine’s plans 
of parley. Even though they are submitting to Tamburlaine, Techelles and Usumcasane 
still make the deliberate choice to move (or in this case, not move) their bodies. When the 
soldiers decide to conform to the new battle plans by way of their flesh, they illustrate 
Elaine Scarry’s argument that “the will itself is couched in embodiment” (875).  Because 
“movement locates, rather than merely illustrates the will,” the soldiers’ obedient actions 
both indicate submission and testify to their own embodiments of will (875). Such 
personal will makes the soldiers’ bodies potential threats to Tamburlaine’s supreme 
sovereignty. The soldiers’ consenting bodies are the key to Tamburlaine’s tyranny, and 
yet they are also the ever-present challenge to the notion of pure totalitarianism. The 
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Tamburlaine plays prove that an embodied contingency lurks just below the surface of 
every demand.  
 When a character in Tamburlaine consents to the protagonist’s wishes, he or she 
demonstrates agency in the embodied act of submission. Elaine Scarry’s essay, “Consent 
and the Body” resonates with the paradox of embodiment present throughout Parts 1 and 
2. Scarry writes,  
The whole issue of consent, by holding within it notions of sovereignty and 
authorization, bears within it extremely active powers. Yet it often arises precisely 
at the point where by any conventional description there seems an extreme of 
passivity (873).16  
Tamburlaine attempts to maintain that his objectification of bodies occurs within a 
paradigm in which he is the active agent and his interlocutor is passive. In Part 2, a 
frightened messenger spreads this myth of passive consent, reporting to the Sultan of 
Egypt that Tamburlaine “commands the hearts of his associates” with such unidirectional 
authority that “It might amaze [his] royal majesty” (Part 2, IV. i. 15-16).  The plays, on 
the other hand, deny this dream of pure absolutism by exposing the extremely active 
nature of embodied consent. To put this in Žižekian terms, embodied consent is the 
“inherent transgression” of Tamburlaine’s regime; it is that which is both “publicly 
disavowed” and “the ultimate support of the existing power edifice” (217). Tamburlaine 
can’t take over the world unless other bodies acquiesce to his will; however, to 
acknowledge another person’s active consent would mean recognizing that body’s 
sovereignty and would therefore tacitly destroy the myth of pure totalitarian rule.   
 The necessity of consent in Tamburlaine is both artfully staged and yet studiously 
ignored in one of Marlowe’s most canonical scenes. In Act 1, Scene 2, Tamburlaine 
appears to effortlessly draft the Persian general, Theridamas into his thieving band of 
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Scythian warriors with a seemingly preternatural power of performative speech. In fact, it 
is a testament to the power of Tamburlaine’s illusion that critics often quote Act 1 Scene 
2 when describing Tamburlaine as a master of speech-acts.17 This critical tradition is not 
surprising considering that Theridamas marvels at Tamburlaine’s “enchantments” (Part 
1, I. ii. 224) and consents to his new position in Tamburlaine’s band by declaring, “Won 
with thy words and conquered with thy looks, / I yield myself, my men, and horse to thee, 
/ To be partaker of thy good or ill / As long as life maintains Theridamas” (Part I, I. ii. 
228-231). Marlowe’s audience recognizes that what may appear like a speech-act actually 
involves the performance of active, embodied consent. Despite saying he has been 
enchanted by Tamburlaine, Theridamas chooses to “forsake [his] king and join with 
[Tamburlaine]” (171). By having Theridamas choose to join Tamburlaine’s quest for 
world domination, Tamburlaine Part 1 grants Theridamas agency.  
 Tamburlaine Part 1 also uses the interaction between Tamburlaine and 
Theridamas to highlight the embodied nature of all consent. Theridamas goes from being 
the “very legs” (Part 1, I. i. 59) of Persia to a seemingly sycophantic “trusty friend of 
Tamburlaine” (Part 1, I. ii. 227). As a general of war, Theridamas’s allegiance is 
inherently tied to his physical well-being. By willing his loyalty to Tamburlaine, 
Theridamas promises to sacrifice his body in battle. Beyond the inevitable physicality of 
war, the scene further emphasizes embodiment when Tamburlaine solemnizes 
Theridamas’s submission with the same anatomical rhetoric used in Renaissance 
marriages, telling Theridamas to “take here my hand … Thus shall my heart be still 
combined with thine / Until our bodies turn to elements / And both our souls aspire 
celestial thrones” (Part 1, I. ii. 234, 236-237). 18 Theridamas performs his consent with 
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his tangible body in battle and with his metaphorical body in this ceremony of fleshly 
union. A number of scholarly readings understandably focus on the quasi-spousal 
relationship between the two men and the supposed “enchantments” of Tamburlaine’s 
speech, rather than on the fact that this exchange is in fact a transaction of active consent 
performed both materially and figuratively through Theridamas’s body.19 By ignoring 
Theridamas’s consent, these analyses elide this character’s agency and consequently 
participate in the very charade Tamburlaine Parts 1 and 2 reveal as such.  The 
Tamburlaine plays deny this myth and reveal the contingency of embodiment that 
Tamburlaine and Theridamas conspire to conceal.  
 Another oft-quoted scene in Marlowe’s first volume features the suicide of the 
Median lord, Agydas. After he is overheard telling Zenocrate that her captor and object of 
affection is “vile and barbarous” (Part 1, III. ii. 26), Agydas is handed a dagger by 
Techelles with the message, “See you, Agydas, how the king salutes you! / He bids you 
prophesy what it imports” (Part 1, III. ii. 88-89).  Agydas then kills himself with the 
weapon in question under the assumption that the dagger prophesies he “shalt surely die” 
(Part 1, III. ii. 95). This suicide at first appears like an exemplary illustration of 
Tamburlaine’s labor-free performative speech and unstoppable power. However, through 
the lens of consent, it becomes clear that even Agydas, a figure seemingly plagued by 
fates and a tyrant’s rage (Part 1, III. ii. 101-102), still actively consents to participate in 
this rhetorical schema. With the intention to “let Agydas by Agydas die” (Part 1, III. ii. 
105), the Median’s body performs his active consent onto itself, creating a fatal circuit of 
embodied agency through the act of self-administered death. Tamburlaine does not 
simply speak or metonymically signal Agydas’s destruction. On the contrary, Agydas 
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agrees to destroy his body in accordance with Tamburlaine’s discourse of divined might. 
The play also hints at embodiment’s subversive potential in this moment as the power of 
prophecy is transferred to Agydas. Tamburlaine’s overidentification with oracles will 
later make these destabilizing possibilities of embodiment impossible to ignore.  With 
Agydas, Tamburlaine Part 1 reveals the ways in which even a suicide is inherently a 
transaction of consent. 
 When Agydas seditiously insults Tamburlaine in Act 3, Zenocrate spurns her 
fellow hostage, and declares that her opinion of Tamburlaine has changed. Zenocrate 
rivals the devotion of Theridamas when she declares her desire to “leave [her] body 
senseless as the earth” if she cannot “live and die with Tamburlaine!” (Part 1, 3. 2. 22, 
24). As with Theridamas in Act 2, Zenocrate flips her previous loyalties and begins to 
support Tamburlaine with such seemingly “enchanted” passion, that it becomes easy to 
ignore her performance as one of active, embodied consent.  Zenocrate’s narrative in 
Tamburlaine seems to be one of strict objectification, but proves far more complex.20 
Mary Beth Rose explains that while “Tamburlaine objectifies Zenocrate by aes-
theticizing her and rendering her static,” Marlowe’s protagonist is also objectified in the 
dialogue of others (5). While Rose’s analysis astutely identifies Tamburlaine’s 
interpellation in his public word, I argue that Zenocrate’s portrayal is far from static. 
Marlowe stages a series of consensual transactions between Zenocrate and Tamburlaine, 
all of which play themselves out by way of Zenocrate’s body. 
 The Egyptian princess’ body is the site of both her supposed objectification and 
personal autonomy. Zenocrate’s first appearance on the stage in Marlowe’s first volume 
sets her up to be understood as an object, rather than an autonomous agent in 
19 
Tamburlaine’s schema. In Act 1, Scene 2, Tamburlaine leads the Egyptian princess, 
Zenocrate, and multiple Egyptian lords in tow after a successful military conquest. 
Tamburlaine tells Zenocrate to not be upset with her new situation because “The jewels 
and treasure we have ta’en / Shall be reserved, and you in better state / Than if you were 
arrived in Syria” in her own father’s arms (Part 1, I. ii. 2-3). In Tamburlaine’s attempt to 
pacify Zenocrate, he equates her with decorative jewels and money, assigning her a 
notional value.21 Later in the same scene, Zenocrate’s status as decorative object is reified 
when Agydas pleads to Tamburlaine that “I hope our lady’s treasure and our own/ May 
serve for ransom to our liberties” (Part 1, I. Ii. 74-75), and again as Tamburlaine 
continues to woo the Egyptian princess. He tells Zenocrate how he will adorn her with 
jewels and bring her beauty to new settings. In other words, Tamburlaine promises to 
heap precious metals on top of a body he has already codified as a coin. 
 Tamburlaine’s treasure-laden speech is not a command or work of enchantment as 
it may first appear; this interaction is a transaction of consent. After all, why does 
Tamburlaine work so hard to flatter Zenocrate by calling her “lovelier than the love of 
Jove, / Brighter than the silver Rhodope / Fairer than whitest snow on Scythian hills (Part 
1, I. ii. 87-89)? Tamburlaine flatters Zenocrate for the same reason that he offers her 
garments of “Median silk, enchased with precious jewels” (Part 1, I. ii. 95-96): in order 
to persuade her to stay with him willingly. Tamburlaine asks for Zenocrate’s consent, 
occluding the fact that he already has her body physically bound to his own at this 
moment. He still seeks her acquiescence, however, because Tamburlaine’s illusion of 
performative speech and the resulting objectification of bodies like that of Zenocrate is 
always contingent on the embodied agency of others. In other words, despite what 
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Tamburlaine says, he actually needs Zenocrate to choose him, just as he has chosen her. 
When Tamburlaine finally says that Zenocrate and her lords must either “willingly 
remain with [him]”…” Or else … be forced with slavery,” 22 Zenocrate submits, saying, 
“I must be pleased perforce, wretched Zenocrate!” (Part 1, I. ii. 254, 256, 259).23 
Zenocrate’s enactment of embodied consent shows that collaboration is always a 
requirement for the dominance of any ideological schema.24  
 One of the most complex illustrations of the speech-act / embodied consent 
paradox in Tamburlaine occurs in connection with the seeming objectification and 
eventual suicide of the Turkish emperor and empress, Bajazeth and Zabina. 
Tamburlaine’s sadistic25 treatment of his Turkish captives is so extreme that it makes 
Marlowe’s play seem more like a farce than a tragedy. In fact, Tamburlaine becomes a 
parody of himself during his interactions with Bajazaeth and Zabina, indicating the 
sovereign’s overidentification with his role as scourge of God.26 The play calls attention 
to the excessive nature of Tamburlaine’s self-identification by having his gruesome 
interactions with Bajazeth and Zabina tend toward parody. Tamburlaine locks Bajazeth 
and Zabina in a cage, tortures them with thirst and starvation, then perversely suggests 
Bajazeth eat his wife “while she is fat” (Part 1, IV. iv. 49). In one of Marlowe’s most 
infamous stage directions, Tamburlaine uses Bajazeth as a footstool, thereby forcing the 
Turk to corporeally perform his objectification. Bajazeth refuses to deliberately consent 
to his new position, saying his captors will have to “rip his bowels” before he “submits to 
such slavery,” but Tamburlaine “gets up on [Bajazeth] into his chair,” all the same (Part 
1, IV. ii. 16, 18, 28). Tamburlaine makes Bajazeth physically embody what he already 
represents for his captor: an article that must be surpassed and crushed in the pursuit of 
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world domination.27 Regardless of their humiliating subjugation in the hands of 
Tamburlaine, Bajazeth and Zabina’s unflinching refusal to agree with their captor’s right 
to the Turkish crown challenges Tamburlaine’s despotic narrative.  The Tamburlaine 
plays challenge previous depictions of agency in consent when Bajazeth kills himself by 
“braining” himself against his cage (Part 1, V. i. 303). Bajazeth’s fleshy suicide echoes 
that of Agydas earlier in the play, but with pivotal contextual differences. While Agydas 
consents to see reality according to Tamburlaine’s public word, Bajazeth never does. In 
the moment of his grotesque suicide, Bajazeth refuses Tamburlaine’s ideological fantasy, 
deciding to escape Tamburlaine’s torturous grasp and take his own life by “beating [his] 
brains out of [his] conquered head” (Part 1, V. i. 287). When Zabina discovers her 
husband’s mangled remains, she joins his resistant form of consent and “runs against the 
cage and brains herself” (Part 1, V. i. 318). Marlowe uses Bajazeth and Zabina’s 
resistant consent to point out the ways in which a character can simultaneously escape the 
contract of submission with Tamburlaine as he or she is conforming to it. Bajazeth and 
Zabina’s corpses may prove Tamburlaine’s material power as a conqueror, but still defy3 
Tamburlaine’s linguistic power as an idealogue. Bajazeth and Zabina thus become 
evidence for the “inherent transgression” that resides in the need for both consensual 
living and objectified dead bodies.   
 From Bajazeth and Zabina’s resistant consent, the play finally arrives at 
Zenocrate’s total refusal of consent upon her death. Tamburlaine tries to command his 
expiring wife to “live still” and by doing so “conserve [his] life” in turn, but she refuses, 
seeking instead his permission to “let me die, my love, let me die” (Part 2, II. iv. 66). By 
refusing to consent to her husband’s demands, Zenocrate points out that his system of 
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control can only function when the other bodies on the stage actively follow the public 
word of power. Zenocrate recognizes her body’s imminent mortality as it “wanes with 
enforced and necessary change,” and she declines to entertain her husband’s futile wishes 
that “may never such a change transform my love” (Part 2, II. iv. 46-47).  Tamburlaine’s 
failure as a supreme monarch is two-fold in this scene: he cannot force Zenocrate’s body 
to live, and he cannot force her embodied will to try.  Tamburlaine’s overidentification as 
the “scourge of God” is rendered impotent in the face of his wife’s bodily death, which 
Tamburlaine quite accurately calls the “scourge of the scourge of the immortal God” 
(Part 2, II. iv. 80).  
 At first, Tamburlaine attempts to deny the embodied contingency of his ideology 
by treating his wife’s dead body just as he did while she was alive, encasing it in gold and 
carting it around to battle after battle with him. Dead or alive, Tamburlaine insists on 
making Zenocrate’s body his jewel, his object. Because Zenocrate is “lucky” enough to 
be “she with whom [Tamburlaine is] in love” (Part 1, I. ii. 107-108), she is a treasured 
object according to Tamburlaine’s explicit discourse of power, but an object and a 
possession nonetheless. If Tamburlaine so successfully turns bodies like Zenocrate’s into 
commodities through his speech, why does he mourn his wife’s passing with such grief, 
anger, and fear? Tamburlaine’s policy of speech-acts should mean that there is no 
difference between a living and a deceased body. Zenocrate’s death proves that there is in 
fact a vast difference between an alive and a dead body and this distinction is the secret 
of embodiment made spectacularly clear.28 Tamburlaine has to acknowledge the fact that 
embodiment signifies mortality, the vulnerability of “frail and transitory flesh” (Part 2, 
II. iv. 43). No matter how hard Tamburlaine re-iterates his own overidentification with 
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totalitarian sovereignty by wrapping Zenocrate’s body in gold or by trying to believe “she 
lives” even “though she be dead” (Part 2, II. iv. 127), the truth of a life through 
embodiment means eventual death. Tamburlaine wants to separate dead bodies from live 
ones in order to obscure the fundamental fact that each constitutes the inherent 
transgression of corporeal proof and consent. Tamburlaine hopes to make corpses, slaves, 
and consenting allies into objects, but the plays themselves show that the conqueror 
ultimately fails in each category. It is the inherent vulnerability of embodiment that so 
terrifies Marlowe’s character, a shepherd-turned-emperor who has staked his entire 
identity on being a man with no vulnerabilities.  Zenocrate’s shift from life to death 
actually highlights Tamburlaine’s need for both kinds of verification, and implicates his 
own body in the proof-and-consent dynamic he tries to disavow. 	   Like Zenocrate, Theridamas refuses to participate in Tamburlaine’s desperate 
attempts to deny the reality of embodiment and the inevitability of mortality biological 
existence demands. He beseeches Tamburlaine with emotion, saying,  
Ah, good my lord, be patient. She is dead, 
And all this raging cannot make her live.  
If words might serve, our voice hath rent the air, 
If tears, our eyes have watered all the earth,  
If grief, our murdered hearts have strained forth blood.  
Nothing prevails, for she is dead, my lord (Part 2, II. iv. 119-124).  
 
By telling Tamburlaine that no amount of “raging” can bring his beloved back to life, 
Theridamas refuses the existence of the speech-act entirely. Because to “rage” means to 
either act or speak with feverish violence, Theridamas denies the possibility that 
Tamburlaine can act by speaking. This is to say that Tamburlaine’s most trusted friend 
rejects the fiction of non-contingent, illocutionary speech.  Theridamas is telling 
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Tamburlaine sovereign that not only will his “vaunts [not] prove substantial,” but speech 
and action in this case, are mutually exclusive. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Lying on his deathbed, Tamburlaine orders his soldiers to bring his heretofore 
hypothetical map onto the stage. Tamburlaine’s world map is the materialization of the 
speech-act fantasy, a fantasy that made Tamburlaine’s gory conquests both possible to 
obtain and impossible to refuse. As Tamburlaine exhaustively lists his geographic 
conquests, the audience recognizes with what success Tamburlaine has managed to 
“write [himself] lord of Africa,” (Part 1,III. ii. 245) and reduce the world to a map, 
naming “provinces, cities, and towns” after himself and his beloved Zenocrate (Part 1,IV 
iv. 81-83). Until now, the map has served as a trope of the effective speech illusion, 
repeatedly invoked in order to point to out the supposed ease with which Tamburlaine 
actualizes his pre-written destiny. At the moment of his death, however, the map reveals 
that along with Tamburlaine’s wasted body, this masquerade has come to its end. 
 Tamburlaine fails to manifest his map’s speech-acts, because “Death forbids [his] 
life” and he must die with much unconquered (Part 2, V. iii. 158, 160). Marlowe 
punctuates the unavoidable necessity of embodied consent as Tamburlaine recognizes his 
final failure. Consent is both embodied and governed by the limits of the body in this 
moment. Tamburlaine’s desiccating flesh cannot agree to the very labor he has vowed to 
accomplish. There is no possibility of consent in the Scythian’s exhausted body. Now 
Death, and not Tamburlaine, is the “monarch of the earth” (Part 2, V. iii. 215).  
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1 A majority of Marlowe biographers and literary historians agree that Marlowe and his 
audience would have encountered the Tamburlaine myth in Sir Thomas Fortescue’s The 
Forest or Collection of Histories (1571) and George Whetstone’s English Mirror (1586).  
 
2 There is a robust critical tradition of seeing Tamburlaine as an un-ironic representation 
of self-created sovereignty. See Battenhouse, Bevington, W. Brown, Friedenreich, and 
McAldin among others. This is not to suggest that all Tamburlaine criticism fails to bring 
to light Marlowe’s ambiguous relationship to the self-made tyrant. See critics such as 
Peter Berek, Marjorie Garber and Constance Brown Kuriyama for readings that allow for 
this potential ambiguity.  
 
3 At first, Tamburlaine may not appear to be a prime candidate for overidentification 
because he wants to expand, not subvert the Scythian hegemony. Tamburlaine’s 
overidentification with the “explicit power discourse” in Marlowe’s dramas complicates 
Žižek’s original concept of the term, because this overidentification is not strictly a 
means of “subversion through identification” (Plague of Fantasies 29). Whether or not 
Tamburlaine intends to subvert his own power edifice becomes irrelevant by the end of 
the second play because Marlowe makes it clear that Tamburlaine’s too-literal 
interpretation of performative speech works to prove that tautology wrong.  
 
4 Tamburlaine was not only Marlowe’s first big hit production, it was one of the first 
enormously popular plays of Elizabethan theatre. Marlowe even tells his audience that he 
was compelled to “pen his Second Part” (Part 2, prologue. 3) because of the first play’s 
box-office success.  
 
5 The plays never detail the “original” word of prophecies Tamburlaine references, nor 
the original sources. Rather, only Tamburlaine’s understandings of oracles are provided. 
The agency of interpretation may be yet another unexplored inroad into the façade of 
unmitigated dominion.  
 
6 The audience never actually hears these prophecies except through the lens of 
Tamburlaine’s interpretations, making them a kind of “lost origin” of the plays’ 
ideological schema.  
 
7 Because Tamburlaine is not yet in power at this point in the drama, his claims are what 
Pierre Bourdieu terms a “mistranslation” according to the existing power discourse. 
Marlowe’s protagonist “mistranslates” prophecies about his fated kingship through 
military victory. 
 
8 In her essay, “Here is Nothing Writ,” Marjorie Garber insists that Tamburlaine’s pen is 
a metonym for his sword, pinning Tamburlaine in a metaphorical battle with his 
playwright-creator, Marlowe.  
 
9 Tamburlaine’s insistence on the violence of words renders the often-unrepresented but 
highly-discussed battle scenes redundant. In fact, Tamburlaine’s structure has been 
26 
	  
likened to Roman triumphal processions, which celebrated martial victories through 
theatrical parades, showing off the spoils of wars such as dead and enslaved bodies.  
 
10 Interestingly, Marlowe’s second Tamburlaine play does not offer this same repeated 
union of word and sword.  
 
11 In one instance, Tamburlaine tries to say he has control of his future, declaring, “I 
hold the Fates bound fast in iron chains / And with my hand turn Fortune’s wheel about” 
(Part 1, I. ii. 174-175). 
 
12 Tamburlaine repeatedly connects his public word with his honor throughout these two 
plays. Furthermore, he conceptualizes his sovereignty as an outcome of this honor in 
several instances, such as when he says his honor “consists in shedding blood” (Part 1, 
V. i. 477) in Part 1, and “wondrous victories” (Part 2, IV. i. 206) in Part 2.  
 
13 Tamburlaine’s insistence on taking the Persian crown in battle may also open this 
scene up to arguments regarding the importance of embodied witnesses in the constitution 
of reality. Furthermore, it could be said that Marlowe is reflecting on the nature of 
dramatic works written for live performance and the nature of Elizabethan theatre as a 
literary genre of spectacle. This scene also brings to mind issues of sanctioned speech-
acts in legal hierarchies. Mark Thornton Burnett contends that “by co-ordinating multiple 
coronations and his own marriage, [Tamburlaine] executes the role of archbishop, 
suggesting that, contestatory actions notwithstanding, a need for formal sanction is still in 
evidence” (134). Burnett’s argument augments my own because Tamburlaine’s need for 
“formal sanction” indicates his adherence to the rules of an illocutionary ideological 
fantasy.  
 
14 Carolyn Williams explores the implications of Calyphas’s effeminacy, while T.M. 
Pearce argues that Tamburlaine embodies the Renaissance educational theories of Sir 
Humphrey Gilbert and Gosson. Paul Kocher sees the stabbing as “an act of military 
discipline” that would prove heroic in Elizabethan ideals.  
 
15 It can be argued that Tamburlaine also uses live bodies to evidence his powers of 
objectification, though this paper will argue that live bodies always bring with them the 
problematic embodiment of sovereignty. Still, one particularly explicit example of live 
bodily evidence occurs in Part 2, when Tamburlaine enters the stage “[all in black, drawn 
in his chariot by the kings of Trebizond and Soria]” (Part 2, V. i. 61). In this scene, 
Tamburlaine literally bridles these objectified men and forces them to be the vehicle of 
his ideological will. Paradoxically, Tamburlaine must materially evidence his power to 
objectify others in order to make it seem as though he did not even need to bridle 
Treibizond and Soria. 
 
16 Elaine Scarry’s article, “Consent and the Body: Injury, Departure, and Desire,” argues 
that in historical and contemporary discourse, the body becomes the “primary ground of 
all subsequent rights.” Scarry discusses the body and consent in regards to medicine, 
27 
	  
political philosophy and marriage law. For more of Scarry’s discussion of the body, 
language, and violence, see her monograph, The Body in Pain. 
 
17 Critics who discuss Tamburlaine’s linguistic prowess include but are certainly not 
limited to Marjorie Garber, Johannes Birringer, Melissa Mohr, Matthew Greenfield and 
the theater studies scholar Martin Miesel.  
 
18 Theridamas and Tamburlaine mirror the early modern legacy of husband and wife 
becoming one flesh with patriarchal sovereign (in this case, Tamburlaine) as head. 
Frances E. Dolan’s Marriage and Violence: The Early Modern Legacy explores models 
of marriage from Renaissance England in depth. Dolan argues that the “one flesh, two 
heads” model of spousal union like that mirrored in Tamburlaine with Theridamas, 
creates power hierarchies and violence. For a methodologically disparate historical study 
of marriage in Elizabethan England, see Keith Wrightson’s English Society 1580-1680.   
 
19 Karen Cunningham, Matthew Greenfield, Alan Shepard and Michelle Warren discuss 
at different lengths the character and embodiment of Theridamas as Tamburlaine’s 
soldier and lackey, but devote their attention to issues other than his performance of 
consent.  
 
20 For discussions of Zenocrate’s objectification, see Jolene Mendel, Mary Beth Rose, 
and Kent Cartwright.  
 
21 Tamburlaine gives words a kind of currency or value, “that is not objective, but 
depends on ‘notional’ determinations” (Žižek, Sublime Object of Ideology,xix). 
Tamburlaine insists that he has the power to unilaterally delegate notional value onto 
words, ignoring the fact that all notional values must be collectively accepted by a 
consenting community. 
 
22 Matthew Sharpe explains that “arguably the key feature that enables us to comprehend 
Žižek’s theorization of ‘totalitarianism’ is his fascination notion of a ‘forced choice’ that 
totalitarian regimes present to their subject (Sharpe 78, Žižek, 1997a: 27ff). The forced 
choice according to Žižek actually differs from my focus on consent, because according 
to Žižek, an option such as death or enslavement is “even worse than open coercion” 
because it forces subjects to pretend that they are freely and willingly participating in 
repulsive actions. I do not disagree with Žižek; however, I want to register the ways in 
which even a forced choice exposes a hegemonic power’s vulnerability to the agency of 
its subjects.  
 
23 A scene between Theridamas and the woman, Olympia in Marlowe’s second part 
offers a glimpse into how the Tamburlaine-Zenocrate interaction could have ended in an 
alternate world. Olympia tricks Theridamas into stabbing her, enacting the kind of 
resistant consent that Marlowe shows in the suicides of Bajazeth and Zabina in Part 2. 
Alan Shepard’s “Soldiers’ Desire in Tamburlaine” offers an interesting reading of 
Theridamas and Olympia’s encounter.  
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24 The collaborative nature of reality is a commonly explored theme in other 
Renaissance tragedies such as Shakespeare’s Coriolanus, in which the playwright’s 
protagonist exposes how “the ongoing deceptive revision of public specification turns out 
to be fantastically unreal”(John Plotz 813). For further discussion of collaborative fiction 
in Elizabethan drama, consult Stephen Greenblatt’s Shakespearean and Stanley Cavell’s 
discussion of withheld and implied consent in The Claim of Reason.  
 
25 Frank Romaney and Robert Lindsey’s introduction to the Penguin Classics edition of 
Marlowe’s complete plays states, “Tamburlaine’s triumphs over his enemies increasingly 
seem the ceremonious exultations of sadism” (xviii). Romaney and Lindsey are only one 
voice in a chorus of scholars who have devoted volumes to ascertaining a message of 
morality in Marlowe’s bloody Tamburlaine dramas. 
 
26 There is a robust critical tradition of disagreement regarding Tamburlaine’s status as a 
tragic drama. Harry Levin agrees with Richard A. Martin when he states that Part 1 is 
“not a tragedy; it is a heroic play or romantic drama” (35), while Robert Egan and 
William Brown refer to it as a “conqueror play.” Thomas McAlindon says that the tragic 
aspects of Tamburlaine are only superficially developed and Mathew Martin argues that 
Tamburlaine is a tragedy with a trauma narrative. Roy Battenhouse and Una Ellis-Fermor 
consider Marlowe’s “comedic element” regarding the limits of human ambition.	  
 
27 Bajazeth’s becoming a footstool can be seen in agreement with what Alan Shepard 
calls the “ancient assumption that human body and natural universe are congruent” (736) 
because Tamburlaine forces his enemy’s body to perform what he believes the universe 
has promised him: in this case, the Turkish throne. This scene is easily one of critics’ 
favorites to excise while citing Marlowe’s propensity for spectacle and over-the-top 
power plays. 
 
28 In her text, Creaturely Ambiguities, Anat Pick brings seemingly disparate voices of 
posthumanist studies together under what she terms, the “logic of flesh.” In her 
introduction, Pick states that by definition, all living bodies are “material, temporal, and 
vulnerable” (5). 
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